A suprisingly good primer into the drama between the State Department, the Communists, and the Nationalists toward the end of the Chinese Civil War. Considering how many few (even educated) Americans know about the precipitous events of Mao and the Communists taking over the mainland, this book is a very engrossing account of the individual characters that dealt with the countless political dilemmas. Undoubtedly, were I teach a class on "China watching", I would make this required reading.

This is an intriguing account of two nations on the precipice: China and the United States.

It’s 1949 and China, ruled by Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek, is losing ground to Mao Zedong and the Communists. And Truman weighs his options.

The United States’ response, or lack of it, goes a long way to establishing the future of the Asian continent, China’s relationship with the Soviet Union, future Communist uprisings in Southeast Asia and the eventual mires of Korea and Vietnam.

It’s story of an administration missing its moment and paying dearly for it.

Among the most interesting parts of this book are the interpersonal relationships, none more intriguing than between Madame Chiang and the U.S. public. She was an exotic, well-spoken, glamorous character, pleading her case for American help, while sending notes back home to the Generalissimo, attempting to keep him in line and his spirits up.

The legacy of this time continues to be felt, and in this is a cautionary tale of what happens when an administration is unprepared for the changing world.

I received this book from Blogging For Books.

For more of my reviews, go to Ralphsbooks.

Fast-paced drama of the differing perspectives of American diplomats, President Truman and how the Americans tried to retain the Nationalist China foothold in China through a paramilitary campaign. However, despite Mdm Chiang's persuasion, and the commitment of American resources (which was definitely never enough given the vast size of China), Americans had to accept that they had lost China to Communism - especially when Britain began to recognise PRC. Still, the loss of China had a long shadow on future presidents and the need to atone for this loss resulted in the Vietnam War, which begot even more losses. After all the back and forth of the US-China relationship, China remains as a rival to US (although there has been the eternal desire for US to make China its ally).

We’ve all watched with fascination those arrangements where hundreds or thousands of dominoes tumble one after the other to form an elaborate illustration. And who hasn't somewhat envied the person who got to tip the first domino?

Such concepts aren’t limited to fun or entertainment. Images of dominoes falling were crucial to U.S. foreign policy following World War II. In fact, tipping dominoes became a political question, phrased as “Who lost China?” The fears that a communist China meant other Asian nations would, like dominoes, fall under communist control would, in fact, eventually lead America into the Vietnam War.

A number of books have been written about China becoming “Red.” Kevin Peraino, though, makes this a highly readable excursion in A Force So Swift: Mao, Truman, and the Birth of Modern China, 1949. Peraino's approach to drawing and keeping the reader in the story of American-Chinese relations in 1949 is by “slipping into the participants’ skins and looking at the dilemmas of 1949 through their eyes.”

Part of America’s problem was that Mao had one objective -- to complete the efforts to make China “Red.” As A Force So Swift details, Amerca couldn’t decide on its objective. While a communist China was unanimously seen as detrimental, the well-intentioned but indecisive Harry Truman and U.S. foreign policy were caught up in a variety of factions. Some wanted to continue to support General Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists but even they differed on the nature of that support. Others viewed the Nationalist regime as corrupt and saw supporting it as throwing good money (or military equipment) after bad. Additionally, the government was divided on whether it should attempt to work out accommodations with Mao and whether it should diplomatically recognize a Red China.

The fact thousands of Protestant American missionaries went to China in the first half of the 20th century played a significant role in two ways. First, their reports to their churches reached a large audience, helping create a large ”China lobby” in the U.S. For them, a communist China was anathema. Second, as Peraino shows, Madame Chiang Kai-shek was a far more powerful force in her husband in trying to cultivate and maintain financial and military support for the Nationalists. Her father had traveled to the U.S., where he became an ordained Methodist minister and returned to China to spend a few years as a native missionary. She, in turn, was sent to America at age 15 to be educated, eventually graduating from Wellesley College and becoming thoroughly acculturated to the U.S.

As an indication of her role in efforts to influence American policy, the first chapter opens with her arriving in Washington, D.C., in December 1948. The extent of her clout is evidenced by the fact that she not only visited then-Secretary of State George Marshall on the day she arrived but also a few days later -- and both times he was hospitalized for kidney disease. While her husband would withdraw from public view for a lengthy period (by coincidence, the same day Dean Acheson succeeded Marshall in late January 1949), she would remain in the U.S. throughout the year, ultimately unsuccessful in generating support for a continued battle against Mao.

Acheson believed any further U.S. role in supporting the Nationalists was doomed to failure. On the other hand, Louis Johnson, appointed Secretary of Defense in March 1949, argued for continued support for the Nationalists. In addition, Congressional support for the Nationalists was headed by Minnesota Congressman Walter Judd, who’d spent approximately 10 years as a missionary in China. Like others, he argued that if Mao was victorious, other Asian countries would fall to the communists.

Truman, like Acheson, thought a wait-and-see attitude toward China was the best. Part of the State Department’s thinking was that by waiting China and the Soviet Union would come into conflict, reducing political conflict between China and the United States. Ultimately, events outpaced the administration. Not only did Mao take over China and find support from the Soviet Union, Great Britain would recognize Mao’s China.

With an established Red China, Congress wanted to know who, particularly in the State Department, “lost” China to the commies. In the eyes of many policymakers, the first domino had fallen. And in formulating foreign policy no one wanted to be the one who lost the next country.

(Originally posted at A Progressive on the Prairie.)

Easy to read, very basic summaries with easy to understand branches to multiple bodies.

A narrative that never quite managed to get going, mostly because most of the important events happened before this narrative begins and far away from the United States. In spite of what most chauvinistic Americans tend to believe, not everything in the world revolves around them and things can happen that are beyond their control. There were some novel details though.

I struggled a bit with rating this book, mainly because this book turned out to be very different from what I expected. I’m quite selective when it comes to non-fiction books, since I know it generally takes more effort on my part to concentrate and focus on what I’m reading due to life’s many distractions. When I see a non-fiction book on a subject that piques my interest, I pick it up hoping that the information will be presented in a way that is engaging and insightful. I’m a bit of a history fanatic and love learning new things, so I tend to gravitate toward books that have a historical element to them. While this book definitely covered the history aspect well, the part that made it difficult for me to get into was its heavy focus on politics. I’ve always viewed politics as a complicated game with constantly-changing rules and a playbook so complex that only those players well-versed in its language have a decent shot at success. I’m not one of those players and never will be. I know enough about the basics to help me get through life, but that’s about it – most politics go way above my head and to be honest, I’m fine with that, as I have no interest whatsoever trying to understand it. It’s no surprise then that I try to stay away from books that are heavy on politics and this is why Kevin Peraino’s [b:A Force So Swift: Mao, Truman, and the Birth of Modern China, 1949|33626973|A Force So Swift Mao, Truman, and the Birth of Modern China, 1949|Kevin Peraino|https://images.gr-assets.com/books/1493101823s/33626973.jpg|54464787] didn’t really work for me.

The book recounts the one year timespan from when Harry Truman starts his second term as President of the U.S. in 1948 to the rise of infamous Communist dictator Mao Zedong and his establishment of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949. Historically, the author covered quite a bit of ground, starting from the end of the Second World War and its effect on the various countries that were involved (specifically the countries that formed the Axis and Allied Powers during the war), running through some of the major events that occurred during that time and the various players involved. There was also a bit of back history about China, the rise of Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek and the Soong family, Mao Zedong’s early years and his role during the war, the Japanese occupation of China and its aftermath, etc. – it also touched on some of the cultural differences between China and the U.S. and the basis for these differences from history….this first third or so of the book that dealt with history and culture I absolutely enjoyed. However, after that, the book started to focus more on the American side of things – more specifically, the intricacies of American politics and development of foreign policy during the Truman administration, details about the political players and strategists who shaped the U.S. policy toward China and the rest of the Pacific, the roles that Europe and also Russia played, etc. – this is where the book started losing me and after I dozed off a few times while reading, I decided to skim my way through the rest of it.

I ended up rating this book 3 stars because it was actually very well-written and well-researched, plus the history and culture parts were really good, it’s just that I didn’t care for the minutiae with the politics, which unfortunately was majority of the book. For someone like me who is not into politics, I found this book a bit too tedious and way too long (my version came in at a little under 300 pages, with nearly 100 pages of notes/references in the back). Overall, this is a good book that I’m sure those who are into politics will find fascinating and also will learn a lot from it (in fact, our current leader in the big white house (and his staff too) should probably read this book so he understands the history behind our relationship with China and why he can’t say the stuff that he has about China and Taiwan the past couple months and not expect to ruffle some feathers – as an added bonus, there’s some stuff about North Korea in here too!).

Received advance reader’s copy from Crown Publishing via Penguin First to Read program.

Fast-paced drama of the differing perspectives of American diplomats, President Truman and how the Americans tried to retain the Nationalist China foothold in China through a paramilitary campaign. However, despite Mdm Chiang's persuasion, and the commitment of American resources (which was definitely never enough given the vast size of China), Americans had to accept that they had lost China to Communism - especially when Britain began to recognise PRC. Still, the loss of China had a long shadow on future presidents and the need to atone for this loss resulted in the Vietnam War, which begot even more losses. After all the back and forth of the US-China relationship, China remains as a rival to US (although there has been the eternal desire for US to make China its ally).

I learned a tremendous amount from this book, a riveting tick-tock of the Truman administration's reaction to the fall of China and the victory of Mao Tse-tung. If you know a lot about this subject already, I'm not sure much is covered here; but if you don't (as I didn't) you'll get a lot out of the insights in this riveting book.