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haoyang's review against another edition
4.0
Which is the most revolutionary class, according to Marx? The one that Madonna namedrops in 'Music'!
The Age of Capital is Hobsbawm's chronological and logical follow-up to The Age of Revolution (1979-1848) and in this book, he briefly describes the immediate circumstances following the 1848 uprisings, comprehensively surveys the manifold developments from 1848 to 1875, and critically examines the impacts of that historical period on such varied fields as science and religion, the arts and mass migration.
The structure of the text is, if I recall correctly, the same as that of The Age of Revolution, and for me at least, it was really useful in making clear the arguments and insights that Hobsbawm had to offer. Broadly speaking, the three parts that make up the text are logically and chronologically-linked, and other than guiding the reader effortlessly through the events that shaped those 3 decades of liberal-bourgeois triumph, it also nicely bridged the work with the one that came before it (Revolution) and the one that came after (Empire). For example, he ends the Conclusion with:
"But surely 'progress' still continued, inevitably, and in the form of bourgeois, capitalist and in a general sense liberal societies. The 'Great Depression' was only an interlude. Was there not economic growth, technical and scientific advance, improvement and peace? Would not the twentieth century be a more glorious, more successful version of the nineteenth?
We now know that it would not be."
In these few lines, Hobsbawm describes the 19th century (which he had, after 300 or so pages, taken us through) so pithily before transitioning so predictably yet impactfully into the disastrous 20th century. What those rhetorical sentences do is help us empathise with the people of the 19th century, helping us see the world as it was through their eyes. What the short final line does is provide the reader with a sort of critical detachment and historical hindsight which emphasises the profound rupture that the 20th century would bring. Subtle or not, I think this is a rather good way of making historiography accessible to the layman -- anyone who reads the Conclusion will more or less be able to periodise the 19th and 20th centuries the way Hobsbawm does.
And indeed, after having read a number of historical texts, I must admit that I am a sucker for Conclusions. And thankfully enough, Hobsbawm writes a pretty perfect one here, such that it sums up nicely all that has been said in just 6 pages. I believe a litmus test for a well-written work of history is whether one understands with ease whatever is written in the Conclusion or if one finds themselves flipping through trying to fill in empty holes.
In a similar vein, even though he is not the most writerly historian I have read -- Carl E. Schorske's Fin-de-siecle Vienna remains one of my favourite history texts -- Hobsbawm does try to write in a more engaging manner without there being excessive authorial voice (though it is heard, and moral judgments are, thankfully, cast from time to time) nor narrativisation. Indeed, as much as I found myself trudging along, reading at most 20 pages in one sitting, I must say Hobsbawm achieves a delicate balance of brevity and depth; no chapter is too short nor too long, no paragraph ridden with boring examples. Although some readers find footnotes intrusive, they are sprinkled moderately among the pages and some of them are actually pretty interesting too. Even the tables of data and world maps appended at the back are remarkably concise and economical -- the text largely speaks for itself and those supplementary pieces of content merely serve as icing on the cake.
Although I used to discuss the content of the non-fiction books I read, I have, as of late, begun to lose motivation to do so, especially since it takes a colossal amount of patience to plan, draft, and revise a written text in order for it to be remotely worth reading.
But anyway, the years spanning from the 1848 uprisings to the economic downturn of the 1870s (heralded by the Panic of 1873) are characterised and indeed driven by the rise and dominance of the liberal bourgeoisie in the Western world. Two main bourgeois ideologies dominate this period -- political liberalism, and laissez-faire capitalism. Both are fundamentally egalitarian ideologies that put the individual front and centre, whether asserting that all men (provided you are rational i.e. propertied male) have the right to influence policy/govern (as opposed to rule by the monarchy or aristocracy), or arguing for complete freedom in the market where sheer brutality coexists with outrageous fortunes. Yet, lurking in the shadows are the forces that we are now so acquainted with -- mass political participation, working-class movements, demagogic and far-right anti-liberalism, nationalism. Liberalism, then, was not the liberalism that we know now; in fact, if I'm not wrong, it is associated with the political right in Europe. In the 19th century, political and economic liberalism worked predominantly for the bourgeoisie, and excluded/alienated all other forces from the corridors of power, the working class on the left, and traditionalists on the right. When we have a fundamentally inegalitarian society empowered by formal democracy (expanding of the suffrage) and informal mass political participation, it is pretty evident that such a system cannot last, that the centre cannot hold. And I guess that is a problem that liberal democracies today still face, even though liberalism tries to be ever-inclusive: to what extent should power be shared? How should anti-liberal forces be contained or dealt with? How can we prevent democracy from devouring itself like it did in interwar Germany, as Henry Kissinger so feared?
The bourgeoisie is the most revolutionary class in human history, so Marx claimed. It remains to be seen if the liberal democratic system that those in the West pioneered is the ideal form of government, or if it invariably contains the seeds of its own destruction, bringing the forces of progress and reaction into dialectical conflict.
Hope I will understand my opinions better eventually.
The Age of Capital is Hobsbawm's chronological and logical follow-up to The Age of Revolution (1979-1848) and in this book, he briefly describes the immediate circumstances following the 1848 uprisings, comprehensively surveys the manifold developments from 1848 to 1875, and critically examines the impacts of that historical period on such varied fields as science and religion, the arts and mass migration.
The structure of the text is, if I recall correctly, the same as that of The Age of Revolution, and for me at least, it was really useful in making clear the arguments and insights that Hobsbawm had to offer. Broadly speaking, the three parts that make up the text are logically and chronologically-linked, and other than guiding the reader effortlessly through the events that shaped those 3 decades of liberal-bourgeois triumph, it also nicely bridged the work with the one that came before it (Revolution) and the one that came after (Empire). For example, he ends the Conclusion with:
"But surely 'progress' still continued, inevitably, and in the form of bourgeois, capitalist and in a general sense liberal societies. The 'Great Depression' was only an interlude. Was there not economic growth, technical and scientific advance, improvement and peace? Would not the twentieth century be a more glorious, more successful version of the nineteenth?
We now know that it would not be."
In these few lines, Hobsbawm describes the 19th century (which he had, after 300 or so pages, taken us through) so pithily before transitioning so predictably yet impactfully into the disastrous 20th century. What those rhetorical sentences do is help us empathise with the people of the 19th century, helping us see the world as it was through their eyes. What the short final line does is provide the reader with a sort of critical detachment and historical hindsight which emphasises the profound rupture that the 20th century would bring. Subtle or not, I think this is a rather good way of making historiography accessible to the layman -- anyone who reads the Conclusion will more or less be able to periodise the 19th and 20th centuries the way Hobsbawm does.
And indeed, after having read a number of historical texts, I must admit that I am a sucker for Conclusions. And thankfully enough, Hobsbawm writes a pretty perfect one here, such that it sums up nicely all that has been said in just 6 pages. I believe a litmus test for a well-written work of history is whether one understands with ease whatever is written in the Conclusion or if one finds themselves flipping through trying to fill in empty holes.
In a similar vein, even though he is not the most writerly historian I have read -- Carl E. Schorske's Fin-de-siecle Vienna remains one of my favourite history texts -- Hobsbawm does try to write in a more engaging manner without there being excessive authorial voice (though it is heard, and moral judgments are, thankfully, cast from time to time) nor narrativisation. Indeed, as much as I found myself trudging along, reading at most 20 pages in one sitting, I must say Hobsbawm achieves a delicate balance of brevity and depth; no chapter is too short nor too long, no paragraph ridden with boring examples. Although some readers find footnotes intrusive, they are sprinkled moderately among the pages and some of them are actually pretty interesting too. Even the tables of data and world maps appended at the back are remarkably concise and economical -- the text largely speaks for itself and those supplementary pieces of content merely serve as icing on the cake.
Although I used to discuss the content of the non-fiction books I read, I have, as of late, begun to lose motivation to do so, especially since it takes a colossal amount of patience to plan, draft, and revise a written text in order for it to be remotely worth reading.
But anyway, the years spanning from the 1848 uprisings to the economic downturn of the 1870s (heralded by the Panic of 1873) are characterised and indeed driven by the rise and dominance of the liberal bourgeoisie in the Western world. Two main bourgeois ideologies dominate this period -- political liberalism, and laissez-faire capitalism. Both are fundamentally egalitarian ideologies that put the individual front and centre, whether asserting that all men (provided you are rational i.e. propertied male) have the right to influence policy/govern (as opposed to rule by the monarchy or aristocracy), or arguing for complete freedom in the market where sheer brutality coexists with outrageous fortunes. Yet, lurking in the shadows are the forces that we are now so acquainted with -- mass political participation, working-class movements, demagogic and far-right anti-liberalism, nationalism. Liberalism, then, was not the liberalism that we know now; in fact, if I'm not wrong, it is associated with the political right in Europe. In the 19th century, political and economic liberalism worked predominantly for the bourgeoisie, and excluded/alienated all other forces from the corridors of power, the working class on the left, and traditionalists on the right. When we have a fundamentally inegalitarian society empowered by formal democracy (expanding of the suffrage) and informal mass political participation, it is pretty evident that such a system cannot last, that the centre cannot hold. And I guess that is a problem that liberal democracies today still face, even though liberalism tries to be ever-inclusive: to what extent should power be shared? How should anti-liberal forces be contained or dealt with? How can we prevent democracy from devouring itself like it did in interwar Germany, as Henry Kissinger so feared?
The bourgeoisie is the most revolutionary class in human history, so Marx claimed. It remains to be seen if the liberal democratic system that those in the West pioneered is the ideal form of government, or if it invariably contains the seeds of its own destruction, bringing the forces of progress and reaction into dialectical conflict.
Hope I will understand my opinions better eventually.
daaan's review against another edition
2.0
Whilst there is a wealth of information in this book, the quite clearly Marxist sympathies makes me doubt any analysis performed. The chapter on art is atrocious, in effect asserting that there is a single criteria of assessment for art and music, specifically Hobsbawm's taste.
whatyereadin's review against another edition
5.0
And now on BBC One, The Age of Capital: The Director's Cut, with extra dinosaurs.