Despite the title, I wasn't really expecting what the book delivered. This made it an even more enjoyable read.

A stellar book for officers. The first part, a history of the most famous military failures since the 19th century, can be incredibly dry, but it's worth reading to fully understand the second and third parts. The chapters "Anti-Effeminacy," "Leaders of Men," and "Authoritarianism" are particularly relevant and should be read by all officers as part of their basic training.

It took me two months to finish but it was worth it!

Dixon is an engaging and entertaining curmudgeon, who takes a psychological stab at explaining military incompetence. With several years as a bomb defusal specialist in the Royal Engineers before becoming a psychiatrist, Dixon is well suited to write such a study of generalship. Taking the British-centrism and psychoanalytic perspective as features rather than bugs, this is an interesting attempt to explain and improve the serious failures of military incompetence; starting from lost battles and heavy casualties up to the possibility of a nuclear war in error.

The first part of the book is a chronicle of British military incompetence from Crimea to Operation Market Garden, amply demonstrating several key operational qualities of military incompetence: wastage of life, clinging to tradition, rejection of contrary information, underestimation of the enemy, indecisiveness combined with obstinate persistence in a failing task, failure to exploit opportunities, failure to use reconnaissance and intelligence, predilection for frontal assaults, belief in brute force over deception, scapegoating, suppression of news from the front, and a belief in mystical forces.

The second part goes into the theory of why incompetence generals exhibit these traits. Dixon offers three nested psychological explanations. The first is cognitive dissonance; believing themselves to be great captains of a great army, incompetent officers deny any facts to the contrary, leading their forces into disaster. Second, high levels of cognitive dissonance are associated with the authoritarian personality (see Adorno 1950), along with a love of pomp and pointless order that Dixon classifies as 'military bull'. Third, these are of course the daily life traits of the anal-dystonic ego, and their inability to cope with a messy and chaotic world or the emotional damage of toilet training. I believe that psychoanalyzing from history is a methodological mistake (moreso than standard psychoanalysis), and Dixon uses this argument to gore his personal enemies rather than advance a case. However the cognitive dissonance and authoritarian personality parts seem spot on.

The implicit solutions, stop promoting authoritarian assholes, reduce tradition and increase flexibility in military culture, are the weakest parts of the book. The best way to fight and survive is a poorly understood subject, and Dixon's psychological weakness might have some survival value on a daily basis, even as they lead to systemic disaster. A fun book, but one with some strange oddities.

The book starts with short description of unnecessary carnage in WW-1, Boer war and Crimea, among others. Very helpful for someone who is not a history-buff like myself (buffs are advised by the author to skip this first part).

Then Dixon tries to psychologically explain what caused these mishaps, quoting from many sources.

For example on British in America (p.199): "The men in their scarlet uniforms and white spatterdashes, marching in columns, were the sort of target an ambush force dreams of. (...) som of the British troops broke for cover and fired from behind trees. This appalled [general] Braddock and his officers; they considered skulking behind trees both undisciplined and unsoldierly. So they drove the Tommies back into columns, where of course they were butchered." Similarly (p.292): "A plot to assassinate Hitler during the 1930s was turned down as 'not cricket'- the very words used by the Government of the day."

Dixon writes in a very pleasant, meandering and natural way. An example of a nice understatement (p.120-121): "the Navy (...) did on occasion show a surprising streak of realism, fostered perhaps by the age-old experience of being up against the hard facts of nature- and the dangerously low buoyancy of the human body".

On Montgomery and Kitchener Dixon writes (p371): "Both, when they lapsed, did so as a result of shortcomings in personality rather than intellect". And (p.394): "The theory advanced in this book (...) military incompetence cannot be attributed to dullness of intellect. (...) recurring pattern to military mishaps which defies (...) 'bloody fool' theory".

Another factor explaining incompetence: "the fear of failure rather than the hope of success tends to be the dominant motive force" (p.222).

The Afterword is also great, and sums up a lot of the content of the book. It reads in full (p.405): "Lest the reader should have doubted my qualifications to write this book, let me reassure him that I have marked authoritarian traits, a weak ego, fear of failure motivation, and no illusion about the fact that I would have made a grossly incompetent general. It takes one to know one!"

A bit dry and some of the psychological conclusions seem outdated but interesting nonetheless.

This book covers the psychological factors that lead to horrible leadership failures. It shows how authoritarian personalities that can function during peace, but not during times of stress cause horrible tragedies. For those not interested in military affairs, this also shows up in America's current politics with the rise of authoritarianism in the right and a bit as well on the left. We can see those same types of failure in our government.

Dixon divided his work in three parts, first analysis of the worst blunders in modern military history with an emphasis on the commander's behavior. It's a bit dismal. Then he shows us how the average military establishment attracts and encourages authoritarians. Finally he contrasts and compares successful generals with the failures and the personality differences are drastic.

One critique that can be leveled is that possibly Dixon cherry picked his examples, and while that might be the case, some of the failures were monsters who cared nothing for their men's lives. Should we tolerate psychopaths as leaders for our military or government? Future preventable blunders await.

I've heard about this book in the distant past and thanks to Andrew for reminding me.

In this vein, for information about ordinary soldiers in combat I recommend Marshall's [b:Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War|789859|Men Against Fire The Problem of Battle Command in Future War|S.L.A. Marshall|https://images.gr-assets.com/books/1335282686s/789859.jpg|775844].