I think the book is generally interesting and shows processes happening in the modern ideology and politics. However, elections in USA in 2020 and Russian war against Ukraine have made some of the analytical discussions and conclusions irrelevant in the current situation.

The book's theme is the "Age of Imitation", the age after the fall of communism when countries tried to adopt western liberalism as the new normal. How and when did this go wrong? Why is there a illiberal backlash?

Three different examples made up the majority of the book: eastern Europe that tried to adapt liberalism, gave up older national symbols to join the post-nationalistic EU and became disappointed by people being people; Russia who imitated liberalism to survive but then turned to mirror it to display the west's failings; and the US, where being the winner of the Cold War turns into feeling of being a looser and into fear of being replaced. Finally, the authors' eyes turn towards China which projects its influence but not its ideology across the world: with that the book calls for an end of the Age of Imitation (of liberal values) as the new world order (whatever that will be) will hopefully not try to convert other countries into their ideology (as happened during the Cold War).

Sadly the book does not contain too many concrete hints how to deal with new illiberal movements.. it itself is wittingly written, the passage that compares the Trumpian Republican Party with a football club where cititzens are exchanged by the club's fanbase explains a lot of the lack of Trump feeling no obligation to represent the fans of "other" clubs.

mulle avastas eelmine loetud Krastevi raamat, "Pärast Euroopat", üsna kõvasti muljet - sain sealt esimest korda tõuke mõelda, et tõesti, mis sai Fukuyama lubatud ajaloo lõpust, ja üleüldse, mis juhtus (Brexit ja Trump ja populismi võidukäik jne). siin arendatakse seda teemat edasi ja uuritakse, kuidas ikkagi läks nii, et 30 aastat pärast raudse eesriide langemist ei ole kõik maailma riigid liberaalsed demokraatiad.

kolm põhiteemat võetakse siin ette - Kesk-Euroopa populistid (põhiliset keskendutakse Poolale ja Ungarile), Venemaa ja Trump. lõpus kergelt puudutatakse Hiinat ka. läbivaks teemaks on valitud jäljendamine - tees on enamvähem see, et nii idablokist vabanenud Euroopa riigid, Venemaa kui Hiina on 30 aastat jäljendanud lääne liberaalset demokraatiat, igaüks omal moel. Kesk-Euroopas on katse lääne väärtusi omaks võtta viinud illusioonide purunemise ja reaktsioonilise illiberaalsuseni; Venemaa matkis algusest peale teadlikult ja omakasupüüdlikult ainult protsesse, mitte väärtusi (oo, kuidas see Venemaa-peatüki lugemine pani praegusi Ukraina-teemalisi uudiseid uue pilguga lugema) ja Hiina valis jäljendamiseks teaduse ja tehnoloogia, aga ei tunne mingit vajadust isegi teeselda, et neil oleks mingi soov demokraatiat kehtestada.

mulle need Vene ja Trumpi peatükid (viimases räägitakse pikemalt sellest, kuidas USA jaoks ei ole tegelikult kuidagi vajalik ega kasulik, et maailm neid väga jäljendaks, kui liberaalsed väärtused kord juba üle parda on heidetud - pigem vastupidi) tundusid selged ja usutavad; Kesk-Euroopa jutt tekitas päris palju vastuseta jäänud küsimusi. ei tea, kas oli see esimene peatük lihtsalt nõrgem või oli asi selles, et mul oli siin rohkem taustateadmisi ja isiklikke arvamusi.

väga kerge lugemine ei olnud ausalt öeldes; võibolla eestikeelses tõlkes olnuks lihtsam jälgida. aga väga huvitav oli küll ja päris mitu mõtet kirjutasin endale välja, et neid kunagi omaette edasi mõelda.

This book looks to explain the threats to liberalism as they emerged since the fall of the Soviet Union through the concept of “imitation”. Orbán and anti-European populists reject adopting Western liberalism because they will always be seen as second-rate liberals (imitation => disillusionment); Putin undermines Western liberalism by cynically exploiting and inverting it (imitation => retaliation); Trump and the America First movement see the US’s “losing” on the global stage through the lens of its imitation by competitors (imitation => dispossession). China, on the other hand, seems to reject imitating Western liberalism entirely, marking perhaps an end to the era of imitation.

The central conceit of imitation is surprisingly insightful. This is especially the case in the chapter on Orbán (perhaps because it’s closest to home), where the authors quite clearly identify the flaws in the EU’s patronising (?) approach to liberalising Hungary. I wouldn’t consider myself a Euro-sceptic by any means, but this chapter does make me wonder whether the current approach to unifying European nations is that productive, especially if it involves forcing formerly communist states to adopt the values and systems of their erstwhile opponents.

The introduction is clear and to the point, and honestly all you need to read to get the main gist of the book. Unfortunately, the rest of it is quite repetitive, although the authors manage to keep the prose fresh with some cultural references (movies, books, TV shows) which help illustrate their points. Those points are a bit scattered, each chapter does read more like reading a train-of-thought than a well-constructed argument. I suppose the key thing is: if you’re interested in liberalism and these kinds of topics, I’m sure this book will interest you as well. If you’re indifferent to it, I don’t see why this book would change your mind.

PS. This is two books in quick succession now that the meaning behind the title is revealed on the final page. Not sure if I like this trend.